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Abstract.  Payment incentives have significant consequences for the equity 
and efficiency of a health care system, and have recently come to the fore in health 
policy reforms. This paper first discusses the economic rationale for apparent 
international convergence toward payment systems with mixed demand and supply-
side cost sharing. We then summarize the recent payment reforms undertaken in 
Taiwan, Korea and China. Available evidence clearly indicates that incentives matter, 
and that supply-side cost sharing in particular can improve efficiency without 
undermining equity. Further study and monitoring of quality and selection is 
warranted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  Payment incentives have significant consequences for the equity and 
efficiency of a health care system, and have recently come to the fore in health policy 
reforms. Focusing on established market economies, Cutler (2002) describes three 
“waves” of international health policy reform: 1) establishment of universal coverage 
and equal access, with low patient cost sharing; 2) attention to cost controls, rationing 
and expenditure caps; and 3) consideration of incentives and competition.   
In developing and newly industrialized economies, although the institutional 
context differs, a similar pattern applies. The “first wave” of universal coverage is 
relatively more recent, and in some cases ongoing. South Korea established National 
Health Insurance (NHI) in 1989, Taiwan in 1995. In China, only about 10% of rural 
residents and 50% of urban residents have health insurance. Resource-constrained and 
with differing traditions of social solidarity,
1 many emerging market economies have 
been unable or unwilling to cover the same generous package that most established 
market economies offered in the 1960s and 1970s. Health spending remains a modest 
percentage of GDP (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, that percentage has grown 
significantly. For example, health spending grew from less than 3% of South Korean 
GDP in 1980 to about 6% currently. Financing pressures mount. In Korea and Taiwan, 
NHI expenditures have exceeded revenues for several years; urban health insurance 
programs in China have experienced double-digit spending growth.  
  This paper compares payment reforms undertaken in Taiwan—Republic of 
China, South Korea, and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter Taiwan, Korea, 
and China) and analyzes evidence regarding reforms’ effectiveness. These reforms 
not only directly impact Chinese and Koreans—more than a fifth of mankind—but 
                                                            
1 Yang (1997) asserts that “health care should be the right of all citizens, but this view has   2  
also offer insights into how payment alternatives function in widely varying 
institutional contexts, which is of policy import for many other countries.   
We compare patient and provider cost sharing incentives with other emerging 
and established market economies. Demand-side cost sharing was introduced first, 
and in some cases (e.g., Korea) is at excessively high levels, imposing financial risk 
on consumers and a heavy burden on the poor and unhealthy. By contrast, supply-side 
cost sharing is not yet widely used. Results from pilot programs are encouraging; 
provider incentives can foster cost-conscious medical practice without compromising 
quality or solidarity. Accordingly, we suggest that future health care reforms should 
focus on provider incentives. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly discuss the economic 
rationale for apparent international convergence toward payment systems with mixed 
demand and supply-side cost sharing. We then summarize the recent payment reforms 
undertaken in Taiwan, Korea and China in turn.  
 
2. Payment System Incentives 
Payment systems around the world are diverse. Nevertheless, most countries 
now use, or are moving toward, systems that give both consumers and providers 
incentives to balance benefits and costs in their health-care decisions. In health 
economics parlance, “mixed payment systems” feature “cost sharing” on both the 
demand side (i.e., patients) and the supply side (i.e., providers). This conceptual 
overview examines the theoretical rationale for what we speculate will be increasingly 
international convergence toward such a mixed payment system.
2 
                                                                                                                                                                          
never prevailed in Korean public policy” (p 62).  
2 We present this overview of incentive theory, especially supply-side cost sharing, partly because as 
Newhouse (2002, p 17) notes, “outside a coterie of health economists, supply-side cost sharing is less 
well understood” (compared to demand-side cost sharing).    3  
 
2.1 Demand-Side Cost Sharing 
Since for insured consumers the price at point of service is low or zero—
usually well below marginal cost—the consumer has an incentive to over-use services 
(often called moral hazard). One way to curb consumer appetites for “too many” 
services is to require co-payments or co-insurance. Relying on such demand-side cost 
sharing
3 to control costs has several disadvantages, however (see Table 1): it imposes 
financial risk on consumers (Zeckhauser 1970), and can compromise equity by 
creating a barrier to access.
4 Patient cost sharing corresponds to a tax on the sick and 
is disproportionately burdensome for the poor.  
Moreover, demand-side cost sharing does not necessarily reduce the rate of 
health expenditure growth under a fee-for-service system, since providers can request 
more services or charge higher fees. Insurance such as NHI tends to reduce (and 
sometimes eliminate) incentives for patients and physicians to control cost. For 
example, in Taiwan, among those previously uninsured, per capita outpatient visits 
increased by 129 percent, and even among the previously insured group, per capita 
outpatient visits increased by 23 percent after the implementation of NHI (Cheng and 
Chiang 1997). These increases probably reflect not only an increase in patient-
initiated visits, but also a form of supply-side moral hazard: physicians generate more 
visits, provide more services and charge higher fees, knowing patients do not pay the 
full cost of care. This issue of “supplier-induced demand” highlights the importance 
                                                            
3 There are several other terms used for various kinds of demand-side cost sharing: user fees, 
tariffs, copayments, deductibles, ticket moderateur (France), and cost recovery. Informal 
demand-side cost sharing is sometimes called paying a gratuity, and is very common in many 
transitional economies (Kornai and Eggleston 2001), including China (hong bao). 
4 This inequity can also be viewed as an inefficiency of missing insurance markets, since high 
patient cost-sharing prevents consumers from insuring against the financial risk associated 
with becoming severely and/or chronically ill (see e.g. Newhouse 2002, p 17).   4  
of considering incentives on both the demand- and supply-side when designing 
payment systems. 
 
2.2 Supply-Side Cost Sharing 
Just as empirical evidence (e.g., the RAND Health Insurance Experiment; 
Newhouse and co-authors 1993) has shown that health care consumers’ utilization 
decisions are sensitive to price, considerable evidence also suggests that provider 
reimbursement affects quantity and quality of health care services.
5  
The supply-side analog to patient co-insurance is the share of cost borne by 
the provider.  For example, capitation—a fixed payment per enrolled consumer per 
period—rewards providers for strictly limiting services provided.  Lower values of 
supply-side cost sharing lead to “mixed systems.”  In the extreme, pure cost-based 
reimbursement gives providers little economic incentive to control costs.  
  In reality, the payer does not know the exact costs of care and reimbursement 
is based on a price schedule.  One very common contract is fee-for-service (FFS) 
payment.  Since fees typically include a margin of profit, FFS financially rewards 
those who provide large quantities of services.
6   
  Response to financial incentives may be tempered by professional ethics.  
Physicians and other medical professionals act as agents for patient principals in the 
sense that they are called upon to take a patient’s best interest into account when 
using their specialized knowledge for diagnosis and treatment.  In this role, however, 
physicians are called upon to serve the interests of two  “masters”—the patient on the 
one hand and the physician’s employer, payer, or own pocketbook on the other.  The 
                                                            
5 See discussion for example in various chapters of the Handbook of Health Economics (e.g., 
Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). 
6 Another prominent form of provider payment is salary, which bears some similarities to cost 
reimbursement (since the provider is not at risk for costs) but also gives incentive to limit   5  
weight that a provider gives to being a good agent on behalf of a patient (sometimes 
referred to as “agency”; see McGuire 2000) shapes how a provider reacts to financial 
incentives.  A reasonably good agent, for example, will be less inclined to “induce” 
patient demand in order to reap high FFS reimbursement or to deny potentially 
beneficial services in order to retain more capitation payment.  
  At least four advantages of supply-side cost sharing support its widespread 
and increasing use. First, supply-side cost sharing does not impose financial risk on 
patients. Second, it does not discourage medical utilization among low-income 
patients. Third, as Newhouse (1992) indicates, the phenomenal growth of new 
medical technology fuels medical care spending growth. Since providers heavily 
influence use of new technology, supply-side cost sharing could provide more 
effective incentives than demand-side cost sharing for affecting the pace of new 
technology adoption. Finally, intermediate forms of supply-side cost sharing seem 
“fair” for providers, especially those with small panels of patients or risk pools, 
because insurers share the financial risk of costs exceeding the prospective payment 
(Pope 1990). 
 
2.3 Toward an Optimal Payment System 
Much theoretical work (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1990; Ma 1994; Newhouse 
1996) suggests that the optimal provider payment system mixes pre-payment with 
some cost reimbursement. Indeed, an optimal payment system almost surely involves 
mixed levels of both supply-side and demand-side cost sharing (Eggleston 2000).
7   
This result is intuitive: consumers probably prefer to pay some out-of-pocket 
                                                                                                                                                                          
services provided (to increase the provider’s own on-the-job ‘leisure’).  
7 In the simple model developed in Eggleston (2000) and discussed in Newhouse (2002, 
chapter 5), this common mixed payment system emerges as optimal to balance incentives for 
cost control with mitigating risk selection.   6  
deductibles and co-payments rather than to have their health care providers receive 
large financial rewards for skimping on care or discriminating against expensive-to-
treat patients.  
  A general policy conclusion follows immediately: significant benefits flow 
from having both consumers and medical professionals internalize at least part of the 
social trade-off between quality care and scarce resources. The respective 
mechanisms are demand- and supply-side cost sharing.  
  Some researchers consider global budgeting a transitional payment form 
between FFS and capitation or case payment (e.g., Barnum et al 1995). Others 
consider global budgets ideal to control costs. Further empirical evidence from 
diverse institutional settings would help to clarify this debate.  
  Several forms of provider payment require more complex administrative and 
service delivery infrastructure than currently available.  Clearly the “optimal” 
payment arrangement depends on the institutional context.  What works best in Taipei 
or Seoul will surely be inappropriate for rural villages in China.  
 
 
2.4 International Experience: Convergence to a Mixed Payment System 
 
Empirical evidence from countries around the world confirms the correlation 
between disaggregated (FFS) payment and higher cost, at both the broadest (national) 
and narrower (organization and individual physician) levels (e.g., Gerdtham and 
Jönsson 2000; Hickson, Altmeier and Perrin 1987; Krasnick et al 1990). In the US, 
after the prospective payment system (PPS) was introduced for hospitals, admissions 
generally declined, average lengths of stay fell, and some patients got dumped to non-
PPS facilities, consistent with the incentives of case-based payment (see Table 7 in 
Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Just the first two years of implementation saw a 25% 
fall in patient days, with little evidence of any decline in quality or health outcomes,   7  
which “shows that how providers are paid can have large consequences for costs and 
efficiency” (Newhouse 2002, p 28). The rise of managed care organizations in the US, 
with their predisposition toward supply-side controls and aggregated capitation 
payment, further illustrates the power of payment incentives. “The consensus estimate 
would be that patients under managed care spend about 10 percent less than patients 
in indemnity plans, adjusted for differences in the underlying health of the two 
groups” (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000, p 604).  
In light of this evidence, many countries have adopted mixed payment systems. 
Consumer out-of-pocket spending usually accounts for a small but nontrivial 
percentage of a nation’s total health expenditures, while supply-side cost sharing 
through capitation and case-based payment gains ground in most industrialized 
countries (see Table 2).  Emerging market economies are also widely adopting this 
mixed incentive system. 
Although critics often highlight the limitations of simple case payment 
arrangements, simplicity can be a virtue.  The administrative costs of complex 
payment mechanisms can outweigh their nuanced incentive benefits, especially when 
only basic informational and managerial infrastructure supports implementation. It is 
often forgotten that even in US, including capital costs in DRGs took a decade.
8  
Reforms in Taiwan, Korea and China seem to be moving toward mixed 
payment systems.  In particular, both Korea and Taiwan are experimenting with 
supply-side cost sharing in the form of case-based payment (focusing on a few 
categories of service chosen to minimize administrative, clinical and incentive 
complexities) and global budgets (borrowing from German and Canadian experience). 
In the next sections, we discuss payment reforms in Taiwan, Korea and China, in turn. 
                                                            
8 For a recent, detailed discussion of DRG payment as one form of administered pricing, see   8  
 
3. Policy Reforms in Three East Asian Countries 
3.1 Taiwan 
In March 1995, Taiwan implemented national health insurance (NHI) by 
integrating three separate health insurance programs and covering the remaining 
uninsured population. By March 1997, the NHI program earned a 75 percent public 
satisfaction rate, and has consistently ranked among the most popular public programs 
(Lu and Hsiao 2003).  
Taiwan’s NHI aims to provide equal access to health care, ensure quality and 
efficiency, and control health care expenditures within an affordable range.
   To 
achieve these objectives, the NHI program features compulsory universal coverage 




Demand-side Cost Sharing 
NHI imposes modest copayments (lowest for a private clinic visit, higher for 
academic medical centers). Low-income families and families residing in 
mountainous areas or on offshore islands are exempt from cost sharing, as are patients 
who suffer from certain catastrophic or chronic disorders (Lu 1999). Caps on patient 
cost sharing (6% of average national income per admission, and 10% per year) also 
help to ensure equitable access. Lu and Hsiao (2003) calculate that patient out-of-
pocket spending declined from 48% to 30% of total health spending between 1993 
and 2000, concluding that NHI gives Taiwanese fairly comprehensive financial risk 
protection. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Newhouse 2002.   9  
Patients in Taiwan are free to choose their own physicians, and physicians 
who practice in clinics are completely independent of hospitals. Patients often self-
refer, going directly to tertiary hospitals for care. This lack of a referral system, in 
combination with the low cost sharing, contributes to cost escalation as patients 
“doctor shop.”   
To help cope with NHI budget pressures, patient cost sharing increased in 
2001 and again in 2002 for certain kinds of visits, drugs, inpatient care, lab tests and 
examinations (Cheng 2003). Nevertheless, Taiwan’s reliance on demand-side cost 
sharing remains moderate by international standards, and stop-loss features and 
exemptions assure far more financial protection for Taiwan’s patients than for many 
in Korea or China.  
 
Provider Incentives 
  The major payment method under the NHI program is fee-for-service (FFS). 
Hospital staff physicians, traditionally on salary, increasingly receive bonuses tied to 
“revenue productivity” through a system of “professional fees” (Cheng 2003).     
  Taiwan’s NHI designers, aware of the cost-escalating incentives of FFS 
payment, proposed a global budget system with supplemental DRG payment for 
inpatient services. Recent reforms move toward that goal of supplanting FFS with 
supply-side cost sharing.  
  A pilot experiment with case payment initially included 28 frequent 
procedures, such as appendectomy and hemerrhoidectomy. Yang and Lin (2002) 
study inpatient LOS and hospital ownership under case payment, using 2000 data 
from 17,026 patients. Controlling for hospital level and teaching status as well as 
patient age, sex, and discharge status, they find that patients admitted to government-  10  
owned hospitals had longer LOS than patients with similar diagnoses admitted to 
private hospitals.  Further analysis will help to clarify to what extent this result may 
stem from differences in case mix, and whether response to case payment differs by 
ownership type when looking at provider behavior before and after the payment 
change, controlling for other policy and economic changes.  
Tsai and co-authors (2002) examine provider response to case payment by 
analyzing a sample of 49,265 patients who received inpatient care for hemorrhoids. 
The study period covered one year before to almost two years after case payment 
began. Provider response was consistent with theory, apparently increasing the 
number of low-cost cases and pushing high-cost cases over the threshold for FFS 
reimbursement for outlier cases. Overall, spending per case decreased, but the number 
of cases grew faster, resulting in an aggregate increase in spending for this procedure. 
Lang, Chi and Liu (2003) reinforce this finding. They studied the impact of case 
payment for laparoscopic cholecystectomy.  Using open cholecystectomy patients as 
an imperfect comparison group, they find that case payment was associated with 
lower average cost and LOS, but higher volume, resulting in higher total costs for the 
procedure.  The authors found mixed effects on outcomes, as measured by surgical 
mortality, emergency admissions and readmissions.  
Taiwan continues to experiment with payment system reforms, including 
implementation since 1997 of a global budget system with separate global budgets for 
clinic outpatient services, dental services, traditional Chinese medicine, and finally (in 
mid-2002) for inpatient services. Another significant initiative bases payment for five 
major conditions on clinical process and outcomes (a “fee-for-outcomes” approach; 
Cheng 2003). Further research examining the impact of these payment reforms should 
be a top priority.   11  
 
3.2 South Korea 
 
South Korea implemented National Health Insurance in 1989 by expanding 
compulsory insurance from formal-sector employees to the self-employed and 
farmers (Yang 1997). Similar to the Chinese goal of di shuiping, guang fugai (“low 
benefit level, wide coverage”), Korea has achieved virtually universal NHI coverage 
but at a relatively modest benefit level.  Insurance premium contributions are about 
4% of income (Kwon 2002, p 5).  
 
Demand-side cost sharing 
Korean demand-side cost sharing includes deductibles and co-insurance that 
varies by service: 20% for inpatient care, 30% for outpatient services at clinics, and 
about 50% for hospital outpatient services (Yang 1997). This pattern is consistent 
with constraining moral hazard, since it features higher cost sharing for “more 
optional” (i.e., more price-elastic) services. However, these rates are high by 
international standards, and several factors compound the patient burden of cost 
sharing. Many services, including some common and expensive high-technology 
services, fall outside the NHI benefit package. Patients also face special treatment 
charges, a limitation on coverage to a certain number of days per year (including 
“prescription days” as well as inpatient days), and lack of stop-loss coverage (Yang 
1997, p 64-5).  In total, patient cost sharing accounts for about 50% of total health 
spending in Korea—39.3% of inpatient spending (15.7% for copayments and 23.6% 
for full payment for uninsured services) and 61.1% of outpatient spending (36.9% for 
copayments and 24.2% for uninsured services) (Kwon 2002, p 85). Out-of-pocket   12  
payments represent over half of total health expenditure, the highest percentage in the 
OECD (Table 3). 
 
Provider Incentives 
Traditionally, Korean provider payment has been on a FFS basis. As in 
Taiwan, physicians in hospitals are often salaried with bonuses linked to performance. 
Patients have had open choice of provider, frequently self-referring to tertiary care.  
Attempts to implement “gatekeeping” proved ineffective, partly because hospitals 
feared losing market share if they enforced such requirements. 
Although at first Korea’s NHI ran substantial surpluses (in 1994 totaling about 
two years’ premiums; Yang 1997, p 65), health expenditures have exceeded premium 
revenues since 1997. Kwon (2002) suggests the main contributory factors have been 
population aging and lack of provider incentives. The latter points to the importance 
of supply-side incentives for sustaining NHI in Korea, just as in Taiwan. Given the 
already high level of demand-side cost sharing and its adverse implications for social 
solidarity, Kwon argues that “national health insurance in Korea needs to redirect its 
policy priority from the demand-side cost sharing to payment system reform for 
health care providers” (p 91). Several analysts of the Korean NHI experience concur 
(Barnum et al 1995; OECD 2002). 
In Korea and many other Asian economies, the traditional system of providers 
profiting from selling drugs gives incentive to over-prescribe medications. Taiwan has 
reduced the high profit margins for drug dispensing by reducing reimbursements and 
using reference pricing (Lu and Hsiao 2003, p 84). China has recently initiated a 
policy to separate prescription and dispensing functions. Korea legislated such a 
separation in July 2000. Unsurprisingly, the measure proved extremely controversial:    13  
“despite a lengthy planning process and negotiations, in an attempt to derail the 
reform process, the physician group called for an unprecedented four general strikes, 
forcing closure of most clinics and hospital outpatient departments” (Yang and Bae 
2001). The government raised physician fees 45% after the physician strikes, and 
agreed to defer implementation of some other reforms, including those of provider 
payment (Kwon 2002).    
Experimentation with case payment began in the mid-1990s (Yang 1997). 
Kwon (2002) describes the results of these payment reforms in some detail.  Several 
points are of note. As in Taiwan, case payments began with pilot reforms on just a 
few conditions and have subsequently expanded to more conditions and more 
voluntarily participating institutions. Generous margins (on average 23.8%) above the 
FFS reimbursements for the nine selected services (which together account for 25% of 
inpatient cases) helped to overcome provider reluctance to accept the perceived 
infringement of professional autonomy. (Starr [1982] discusses the history of similar 
objections to prepayment among American physicians). Also like in Taiwan and 
several other emerging markets adopting case payment (see Table 4), selection of 
procedures or conditions sought to minimize the scope for undesired provider 
behavioral responses, such as up-coding (“DRG creep”) and stinting on services for 
complex conditions with wide intra-case variation in resource use. Since the Korean 
DRG system, K-DRG, incorporates outlier payment features, like the US PPS, its 
incentives are not extremely high-powered.  With some reimbursement depending on 
actual resource use, K-DRGs are actually a form of mixed payment. K-DRGs also 
represent an expansion of NHI coverage, since they bundle payment for some services 
not included under FFS reimbursements.     14  
Provider response to K-DRG payment has been consistent with theoretical 
predictions. As shown in Table 5, spending per case and LOS both declined, to 
differing extents across case categories. Controlling for institutional type (clinic, 
hospital, or general hospital), DRG-based payment reduced medical expense by 
14.0% and the LOS by 5.7% (Kwon 2002). Providers substituted outpatient for 
inpatient care. The average number of inpatient diagnostic tests fell from 5.06 to 3.85; 
the average number of tests before hospitalization increased from 3.51 to 4.46 (with 
post-discharge tests apparently unaffected); and outpatient visits increased both before 
and after hospitalization (ibid). Quality as measured by rates of complication and re-
operation did not appear adversely affected, although Kwon warns that any expansion 
of case payment to more complicated conditions should be accompanied by 
heightened quality monitoring (ibid). Reforms in 2001 introduced fee negotiation 
between insurer and providers with an aim of capping overall expenditure and 
delegating micro-allocation decisions to the physician association, as in Canada and 
Germany (ibid).  
Further evaluation of the Korean payment reforms would be valuable. A 
“natural experiment” in which some providers accept prospective payment while 
others remain under FFS reimbursement allows researchers to identify a “control 
group” and contrast the “treatment” (new supply-side cost sharing rules) with the 
“control” group. Such a “difference in difference” study design would help to isolate 
the effect of prepayment from confounding trends. Some analysis of Chinese payment 
reforms has applied this approach (Yip and Eggleston 2001). For example, to what 
extent do the increases in numbers of cases (see Table 5) differ from caseload trends 
for these conditions in institutions remaining under FFS? Careful consideration and 
statistical controls should be made for self-selection into the treatment group, however.   15  
Where possible, data should be collected to evaluate whether supply-side cost sharing 
induced cost shifting, selection, or strategic quality distortions. 
Both Yang (1997) and Kwon (2002) emphasize the importance of expanding 
the NHI benefit package. Even if payment reforms achieve the desired behavioral 
changes, they are less likely to have an overall impact—and cost-shifting is more of a 






China’s enviable achievement in improving health from the 1950s through the 
1970s is well known (Sidel 1972; Jamison 1984; Hsiao 1984; World Bank 1997). 
Beginning in 1978, China embarked upon wide-ranging economic reforms resembling 
those of other countries transitioning from central planning to market-based economies.  
These policies have been successful in promoting rapid economic growth, although many 
challenges of transition remain.   
China’s health sector has been far from immune to the transformation. The most 
dramatic changes have been in rural areas.  The Cooperative Medical System (CMS) used 
commune welfare funds to pay village doctors and health stations.  Following agricultural 
decollectivization in the early 1980s, the CMS system collapsed along with the 
communes. In 1979 about 90% of the villages across China were covered by CMS; by 
1989 only 4.8% were (Zhang 1994).  Most village doctors became private practitioners 
relying on FFS payment.  Insurance cover fell precipitously, from about 70% of the 
population in 1981 to only 20% by 1993 (World Bank 1997).  China has encouraged re-
establishment of CMS in rural areas (Yuan and Chen 1994), but implementation has been 
slow, largely because of lack of financing.     16  
China has also introduced significant urban health sector reforms. 
Traditionally, China’s health protection system for urban residents consisted of an 
extensive subsidized public delivery system—implicit coverage—and two explicit 
health insurance programs, the Government Insurance Scheme (GIS) and Labor 
Insurance Scheme (LIS). To expand coverage, move away from SOE-based self-
insurance (which is what LIS amounted to), pool risk at least at the municipal level, 
and revise incentives to encourage greater efficiency, experiments with various 
payment and financing reforms began in the 1990s. The stated goal is di shuiping, 
guang fugai (“low benefit level, wide coverage”).  The expansion of insurance has 
progressed rather slowly, with only half of urban residents currently covered. Zhang 
(2002) reports province- and municipal-level coverage rates in 2001 ranging from 
13.9% in Chongqing to 60% or more in Fujian, Hunan, Qinghai and Tianjin. 
China’s rapid economic growth contrasts sharply with the transformational 
recessions of most transitional economies. Nevertheless, Chinese economic reforms 
have been associated with contracting central government revenues and, in the health 
sector, rapid cost escalation. Government spending on health declined from 22.8% to 
15.3% of total health spending between 1991 and 1999 (Ministry of Health 2001), 
while total health expenditures grew at an average real rate of growth of 13.4% from 
1986-93, almost 4% faster than GDP growth (World Bank 1997).  
 
Demand-side cost sharing 
Not coincidentally, China’s rapid cost escalation has taken place under a 
payment system structure dominated by “free care” for the urban insured and FFS 
payment. Insured patients now pay co-payments that vary by region, usually in the 
10-30% range. Despite this modest cost sharing, low coverage—especially for the   17  
rural population—makes high levels of out-of-pocket spending an equity concern. 
Zhao and co-authors (2002) estimate that individual patient spending constituted 
60.6% of total Chinese health spending in 2000. This percentage has increased from 
37% a decade earlier. Thus, high levels of patient out-of-pocket payment in China, as 
in Korea, suggest that further cost control cannot rely on demand-side cost sharing. 
 
Provider Incentives 
On the supply side, financing reforms drastically reduced government 
subsidies to hospitals and other facilities. To cover the revenue losses on below-cost 
prices for basic services, profit margins were generous for new high technology 
procedures and many pharmaceuticals. As Yip and Eggleston (2004) note, this pricing 
scheme is potentially a second-best government intervention, trading off pricing 
efficiency for equitable access. Unfortunately, the distorted incentives implicit in this 
price system can lead to large adverse side effects, as providers seek to expand 
utilization of—and therefore net revenue from—high technology procedures and 
pharmaceuticals.  
  Pilot programs began in 1994 in the two middle-sized cities of Zhenjiang and 
Jiujiang, with similar local-initiated reforms in Hainan and a few other locations.  
Designed to control cost and pool risk, the reforms draw upon the Singaporean example 
of Medical Savings Accounts. These individual accounts are combined with a social 
insurance fund for catastrophic expenses, usually at the municipal level. Municipal, 
district, or other regional purchasers often implement demand-side and supply-side 
incentive reforms simultaneously with, or soon after, financing reforms.  For example, 
Zhenjiang and Jiujiang introduced a fixed payment system for inpatient and outpatient 
episodes of care simultaneously with city-wide risk pooling. Zhenjiang and Jiujiang had   18  
some success in controlling health cost inflation and improving efficiency, although 
policymakers now question the effectiveness of the “Liang Jiang” model for long-term 
cost containment.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests exacerbated risk selection, cost 
shifting, and reductions in quality of care and equity of access (Yip and Hsiao 1997).  
Authorities in Shanghai decided to implement global budgets for hospitals in 1994 
together with other insurance reforms (Guo and Ge 1998). These policies have reportedly 
reduced health care expenditure growth in Shanghai from 34% prior to 1993 to the 12-
13% growth range currently, without evidence of reduced access or quality of care (Yip 
and Eggleston 2001, 2002).  
  Expansion of urban health insurance reforms leaves decisions about payment 
design to the discretion of local authorities, consistent with widely varying socioeconomic 
and institutional contexts.  This regional diversity offers a wealth of “natural 
experiments” regarding the impact of changing payment incentives.  Unfortunately this 
variation comes compounded with many other socioeconomic changes and a dearth of 
relevant baseline and follow-up data. Many studies report pre- and post-reform average 
expenditures or expenditure growth rates. Although suggestive, such a study design does 
not allow researchers to disentangle various factors that contribute to expenditure changes.  
Moreover, evidence concerning other outcomes of interest, such as the impact on cost 
shifting, quality of care, and risk selection, are usually only anecdotal. Multivariate 
regression analysis of provider- and/or patient-level data to control for confounding 
factors is rare.  
For example, Yang and co-authors (1999) analyze the results of capitating 
hospitals for GIS program beneficiaries’ outpatient expenditures in Putuo district of 
Shanghai.  Per capita outpatient expenditure was 12.3% higher in the year of 
implementation than the previous year, compared to an average annual rate of increase in   19  
the previous three years of 23.4% under FFS reimbursement. Certainly this reduction is 
consistent with the incentives of supply-side cost sharing. But the wide variation in 
growth rates under FFS casts some doubt on this result; the 12.3% growth rate under 
capitation appears quite similar to the 13% growth rate two years prior to capitation’s 
implementation, despite much higher growth rates in other pre-capitation years (which 
average to 23.4%). The authors suggest that capitated rates should be adjusted for the age 
structure of the patient population, given the strong incentives to stint on care for, or 
altogether avoid, chronically ill elderly patients under the 1998 flat-rate capitation 
program.  Unfortunately no evidence is available on the extent of stinting or selection 
under the 1998 reforms.  A longer follow-up period, comparing a range of outcomes with 
a plausible control group (such as a neighboring district in Shanghai that did not revise 
payment) could furnish much greater insight into the impact of such payment reforms. 
  Hainan Province offers an interesting case study. To control costs and reduce 
the administrative burden and political friction of retrospective claims auditing, 
Hainan implemented prospective payment of six key hospitals in January 1997. Yip 
and Eggleston (2001) use claims data for hospital expenditures and a difference-in-
difference analysis to isolate the impact of the payment system reform compared to 
hospitals that were paid on a FFS basis throughout the study period (June 1995-June 
1997). Hospital prepayment is associated with a slower rate of growth of overall 
expenditures, program spending, and patient co-payments per inpatient admission, 
compared to FFS (see Table 6).  Reduced expenditures per admission in the prepaid 
hospitals (by 26-35%, and over 50% compared to trends in FFS hospitals) indicate the 
power of supply-side cost sharing for controlling costs.  Nevertheless, the authors note 
that caution is warranted, since the expenditure decrease could stem from some   20  
combination of reduced quality of care, risk selection, and cost shifting to the 
uninsured.  
In a companion paper, Yip and Eggleston (2004) report that Hainan’s 
prepayment reform was also associated specifically with a slower increase in 
spending on high profit-margin services—expensive drugs and high technology 
services—compared to FFS. The association of supply-side cost sharing with reduced 
growth in spending on the most expensive drugs seems particularly encouraging, 
given that pharmaceuticals account for a remarkably high share of hospitals’ revenue 
(50 to 70 percent) and a large portion of aggregate health spending in China (52 
percent in 1998). The authors conclude that provider payment reform can be an 
effective policy instrument for correcting market failures and adverse side effects of 
government health sector interventions (such as distorted prices to assure access to 
basic services). 
 Further research on the many ongoing payment reforms in China can help to 
clarify the benefits and costs of various payment systems under alternative 
institutional contexts. Few studies focus on administrative costs, but these can be 
crucial to understanding the incremental benefit of introducing more complicated 
payment mechanisms. Also unclear is whether the response to provider payment 
incentives differs systematically by provider type. For example, some theories of 
ownership predict that response to supply-side cost sharing is likely to differ between 
providers that are government-owned, private nonprofits or private for-profit 
organizations.  This may be an important issue in the Taiwanese and Korean contexts, 
where the delivery system features a mix of ownership forms, and an emerging issue   21  
for China, where recent reforms have spawned considerable property rights 





  Experience in established market economies suggests that supply-side 
incentives are critical for sustaining affordable solidarity. Policymakers in Taiwan, 
Korea and China have experimented with similar payment reforms. In most cases, the 
incentives associated with different payment systems are well understood.  Far less 
carefully studied, however, is the actual behavioral response of consumers and 
providers to payment incentives, controlling for confounding factors such as 
coincident reforms in other parts of the health care system that also impact health care 
demand and supply.
10   
Often fiscal pressure drives payment reforms. Nevertheless, the percentage of 
national income devoted to health care in Taiwan, Korea and China is generally close 
to that of other nations with similar per capita income, and still relatively low 
compared to that of many established market countries (see Figure 1). Moreover, even 
in the latter some evidence points to net benefits from technological change 
outweighing high and rising costs (Newhouse 1992; Cutler 2002; Newhouse 2002). 
Arguably more urgent than cost control is the need for better targeting and quality 
promotion. For both, provider incentives should be a priority focus. 
Similar to recommendations by Kornai and Eggleston (2001a,b) for eastern 
Europe, we urge policymakers to continue experimenting with supply-side cost 
sharing, including capitation for primary care and case-based payment for hospitals. 
                                                            
9 See discussion in Eggleston and Yip (2003). 
10 A growing literature documents the magnitude and impact of demand-side elasticities in 
developing countries (see discussion in Gertler and Hammer 1997). Yet surprisingly little   22  
These forms of payment encourage cost control and leave the micro-allocation 
decisions in the hands of those most competent to judge effective use of medical 
resources, the health care professionals delivering care. However, the incentives of 
prospective, fixed payments can be overly strong, financially rewarding 
discrimination against expensive-to-treat patients. We therefore recommend mixed 
payment, that is, both an ex ante (risk-adjusted) fixed payment and some ex post 
payment based on patients’ actual use of health services. 
Implementation and careful evaluation of payment reforms in East Asia and 
other emerging market economies can contribute to more efficient and equitable 
evidence-based policy and to global understanding of supply-side incentives. The 
experience of industrial firm privatization and restructuring in transition economies 
has thrown considerable light on the perennial question of ownership and 
performance (e.g. Djankov and Murrell 2002). Similarly, incentive system reform 
across many different health sector institutional contexts can teach us about human 






                                                                                                                                                                          
systematic analysis elucidates provider response to supply-side cost sharing.   23  
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P  34Table 1.  The Incentive Effects of Payment System Policy Instruments 
 
Policy Instrument  Benefit from a higher value of  
the policy instrument 
Cost of a higher value of  
the policy instrument 
Demand-Side Cost Sharing 
(Co-insurance rate) 
•  constrain over-utilization  
  (curb moral hazard) 
•  inefficient risk bearing 
•  inequity (tax on sick;  
       regressive) 
Supply-Side Cost Sharing   •  constrain over-utilization 
•  encourage cost reduction  
        (production efficiency) 
•  underprovision 
•  risk selection (inequitable 
insurance coverage) 
 
Agency of Behalf of  
Patient Benefits 
(Professional Ethics) 
•  curb supplier-induced demand 
•  moderate underutilization 
•  reduce risk selection 
•  promote equitable access and 
treatment 
•  indulge moral hazard 
 
Source: Eggleston 2000.   36  
 
Table 2. Provider payment systems in selected countries in the late 1990s 
 
Country Primary  care  Outpatient specialists  Inpatient care 
Australia  FFS  FFS  Budgets with indexed cost caps, 
some states adopting case-based 
payment 
Canada  FFS, with global budget to physicians’ association, 
negotiated by province 
Budgets and salary 
China FFS  FFS  FFS,  line-item budgeting and global 
budgets 
Denmark  28% capitation; 63% FFS; 
9% allowances 
Capitation and FFS  Global budgets 
Germany  FFS, with global budget to physicians’ association, 
point system of assigned points per service, with the 
value per point lowered if budget exceeded 
Target budgets and case-based 
payment  
Japan FFS  FFS  FFS  (demonstration project of case-
based payment) 
Korea FFS  FFS  FFS  (pilot projects of case-based 
payment) 
Netherlands  FFS if higher income; 
capitation (age-adjusted) if 
lower income; ex ante high 
risk pooling 
FFS and salary  Global budgets, regionally 
negotiated 
New Zealand  FFS, capitation, budget-
holding 
Contracts and FFS  Contracts and FFS 
Norway  Capitation, salary and FFS  FFS and salary  Global budgets 
Spain  Salary and capitation (age-
adjusted) 
Salary Global  budget  for social security 
hospitals; per diem for other 
hospitals 
Sweden  Salary for public; mixed 
payment in some counties 
Salary + budget  Budgets 
Taiwan FFS  FFS  FFS  (pilot projects of case-based 
payment) 
United Kingdom 
     after 1989 
     reforms 
Capitation (age-adjusted) 
and FFS; GP fundholders 
after 1989 reforms; GP-led 
Primary Care Groups as 
purchasers/fundholders 
after 1999 reforms 
Contracts and FFS  Contracts and FFS 
United States  FFS (resource-based 
relative value scale), 
capitation with risk sharing 
arrangements, etc. 
Primarily FFS  Primarily case-based (DRGs) 
 
Sources: Kornai and Eggleston 2001 and the studies of Taiwan, Korea and China cited in the text.  
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Table 3.  Out-of-pocket payments in selected OECD countries, 1997 
 



















Luxembourg    7.0 








United Kingdom    2.7
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Table 4. Features of systems of payment per case for hospital services across 















Georgia 30  Historical  budget 
and throughput 
norms 
    
Hungary 758  Historical  costs  X  X  X 
 
Kazakhstan 55  Historical 
budgets 
X  
Kvrgyzstan 154  Historical 
budgets  
X X   
Lithuania 50  Historical  bed-
days 
X  







Varies X   
 


















Table 5. Impact of DRG-based Payment on Medical Expense and Length of Stay 
in Voluntarily Participating Korean Health Care Providers 
                             (Unit: won, day, %) 
DRG Code  No. of 
Institutions 







Before (1,589)  929,438 2.36









Before (69)  1,555,621 2.99
After (55)  1,288,732 3.78 04100 
Lens Procedures (binocular)  4 




Before (45)  583,095 3.60










Before (182)  547,764 3.63










Before (787)  458,214 4.50
After (1,689)  454,193 4.48
15700 
Anal &(or) Stomal 
Procedures 
23 




Before (63)  766,764 6.98
After (211)  689,398 5.82
16100 








Before (146)  585,891 3.46
After (452)  499,088 3.50
16110 
Inguinal &(or) Femoral 
Hernia Procedures 
 (Age 0-17) 
9 




Before (117)  1,126,888 8.55
After (171)  1,166,047 8.99 16400 
Complicated Appendectomy  8 




Before (385)  982,592 7.24









Before (783)  987,831 7.61
After (1,696)  934,732 7.01
35800 
Uterine &(or) Adenexa 
Procedures 
16 




Before (1,763)  907,984 7.77
After (2,902)  822,702 7.11 37000 
Cesarean Section  18 




Before (158)  420,562 3.65 37200 
Vaginal Delivery 
7 
After (117)  429,338 3.50 40




Before (2,849)  347,622 3.24
After (6,728)  375,784 3.15
37300 
Vaginal Delivery  
Without Complication 
21 









Source: Kwon 2002. 
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Reform Hospitals FFS Hospitals Diff-in-Diff as %
Before After Diff Before After Diff Diff-in-Diff of Reform Before
Average Expenditure 6428.50 4740.27 -1688.23 5138.26 6927.81 1789.55 -3477.78 -54.10%
   Per Admission [8264.8] [6254.2] [304.06] [7927.9] [10233.1] [995.21] [962.74]
{-5.55} {1.80} {-3.61}
Average Program Expen- 4231.49 3675.71 -555.78 3732.76 5346.80 1614.04 -2169.82 -51.28%
   diture Per Admission  [5362.5] [4966.1] [204.12] [6727.3] [8052.4] [820.49] [663.12]
{-2.72} {1.97} {-3.27}
Average Patient Co- 1482.85 1062.81 -420.04 1268.15 1429.84 161.69 -581.73 -39.23%
   Payments Per Admissio[3819.2] [1659.3] [133.67] [1498.6] [2530.9] [213.25] [406.15]
{-3.14} {0.76} {-1.43}
Average Length of Stay 28.10 20.95 -7.15 40.13 32.28 -7.85 0.70 2.49%
   Per Admission [30.9] [19.3] [1.11] [50.1] [40.6] [5.47] [3.74]
{-6.43} {-1.43} {0.19}
Note: "Before" is 1995/96; "After" is 1997; "Diff" is after minus before; "Diff-in-diff" is diff for reform hospitals minus diff for FFS
hospitals.  The number of observations is 2983 in 1995/96 and 861 in 1997 for reform hospitals, and 263 in 1995/95 and 106 
in 1997 for FFS hospitals. Standard deviations are in straight brackets [ ] and t-statistics are in curly brackets {}.
Table 6.  Impact of Payment Reform in Hainan, China: Average Difference-in-Difference Estimates
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